Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is a leading mechanism driving human cooperation, where monitoring of behaviour and sharing reputation-related information are crucial. Because collecting information is costly, a tragedy of the commons can arise, with some individuals free-riding on information supplied by others. This can be overcome by organising monitors that aggregate information, supported by fees from their information users. We analyse a co-evolutionary model of individuals playing a social dilemma game and monitors watching them; monitors provide information and players vote for a more beneficial monitor. We find that (1) monitors that simply rate defection badly cannot stabilise cooperation-they have to overlook defection against ill-reputed players; (2) such overlooking monitors can stabilise cooperation if players vote for monitors rather than to change their own strategy; (3) STERN monitors, who rate cooperation with ill-reputed players badly, stabilise cooperation more easily than MILD monitors, who do not do so; (4) a STERN monitor wins if it competes with a MILD monitor; and (5) STERN monitors require a high level of surveillance and achieve only lower levels of cooperation, whereas MILD monitors achieve higher levels of cooperation with loose and thus lower cost monitoring. * Electronic address: nakamuramh@soken.ac.jp 1 arXiv:1610.01684v1 [physics.soc-ph]
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation is a universal problem across species [1] [2] [3] . To achieve cooperation, individuals often need to overcome a social dilemma: for the population, allout cooperation is the best, whereas for each individual, it is better to free ride on the contributions of others [4, 5] . Indirect reciprocity, among several other mechanisms, is a leading explanation for the evolution of human cooperation [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In indirect reciprocity, an individual helping another will be helped in the future; cooperative individuals are highly valued and obtain help from others because of their good reputation.
Indirect reciprocity fundamentally depends on the individuals' ability to evaluate others and share information about their reputation (e.g., via gossip). This requires an individual to obtain information about the others' reputation. However, doing so is usually costly. It demands considerable cognitive capacity to recognise and memorise others' past actions [11] [12] [13] . Gossip-based information sharing is vulnerable to liars who strategically spread fake information [14] . As a recently emerging example, electronic marketplaces are adopting feedback mechanisms to assess each seller. However, customers often fail to submit such feedback as this involves extra work [15] [16] [17] [18] . Consequently, the availability and reliability of information suffers from a tragedy of the commons [18, 19] .
An important difference between a material good and information is that information can be copied and distributed among many individuals at negligible cost (even though its acquisition may be costly). Therefore, as Arrow wrote, 'it does not pay that everyone in a society acquires this information, but only a number needed to supply the necessary services' [20] . In human societies, such specialised servicing organisations gathering and providing reputation information, e.g., modern credit companies and online marketplaces, have played a major role [21, 22] . These organisations are maintained by their information users; the users demand the supply of information and contribute fees in return. This can be understood as a mutualism between monitoring services and information users. As far as we know, this has not been explored in the context of indirect reciprocity.
In this study, we apply evolutionary game theory to the analysis of mutualism between users of reputation-related information (i.e., the players) and information-providing services (i.e., the monitors) in the context of indirect reciprocity. We present a co-evolutionary model in which players and monitors seek to adapt their strategies through social learning. The population of players is engaged in a social dilemma game called the donation game; from time to time, one player can decide whether to help another player or not. The strategy can be unconditional: to always help, or to always refuse to help. In this case, cooperation loses out. But players can also use a conditional strategy, and help only those players who have a good reputation. We analyse whether competition between information providers can lead to cooperation in the population of players.
In our evolutionary model, players can occasionally change their behaviour, which fits into one of the afore-mentioned three types: conditional cooperation, unconditional cooperation, or unconditional defection. The conditional cooperators are further permitted to select a better monitor by voting; the voters display their preference for a better monitor, from which the monitors anticipate their potential future payoff if they continue to obey the present strategy. We shall see that a cooperative mutualism is achieved if the voters are ready to select a better monitor in voting rather than change their behaviour in the donation game.
A frequently-studied issue in indirect reciprocity is the evolution of moral assessment rules which determine what kind of behaviour leads to a good reputation [10] . Well-known assessment rules are SCORING, MILD, and STERN. The SCORING rule is the simplest assessment rule: cooperation is good and defection is bad. Under the MILD and STERN rules, defection against players of bad reputation (cheaters) is good. The only disagreement between the MILD and STERN rules is that STERN prescribes punishing players of bad reputation by withholding help, whereas the MILD rule leaves both cooperation and defection options open. The SCORING rule cannot achieve stable cooperation if players simply interact with one another in random matching games (though the SCORING rule is also known to stabilise cooperation with some additional assumptions such as players' growing social networks, multiple reputation states, and assortment in interactions [23] [24] [25] ).
The MILD and STERN rules belong to the few that achieve stable cooperation in random matching games [26] [27] [28] .
We study the three above-mentioned assessment rules and find that SCORING monitors cannot establish cooperative populations, whereas MILD and STERN monitors can.
When comparing MILD and STERN rules, we find that cooperation has a broader basin of attraction with the STERN rule. Moreover, STERN wins when MILD and STERN monitors compete. However, the MILD rule realises a more cooperative population with less frequent (and hence, less costly) monitoring than the STERN rule. This slight difference in the two assessment rules implies a trade-off: STERN is more stable, but MILD is more efficient. MILD always wins against SCORING, but SCORING can displace STERN (and thus subvert cooperation).
II. METHODS
Here we summarise the model by which we numerically simulate the co-evolutionary dynamics. The derivation of the dynamics is described in more detail in the supporting information (SI text, Sec. S1).
A. Population structure, the donation game, and the behaviour of players
We consider a large, well-mixed population of players (see Fig. 1 ). From time to time, the players interact with each other in a social dilemma game called the donation game [8, 9] .
In a (one-shot) donation game, two players are selected at random from the population, and one of them, called the donor, decides whether or not to help the other, called the recipient. These two alternatives are called cooperation (C) and defection (D), respectively.
A donor who cooperates pays a cost c (> 0) to increase the recipient's payoff by an amount b (> c). Each player adopts one of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, or conditional cooperation. An unconditional cooperator or defector always selects C or D, respectively. By contrast, a conditional cooperator selects C or D depending on whether a recipient has a good (G) or bad (B) reputation, respectively. This reputation information comes at a price β (≥ 0).
B. Behaviour of monitors
A monitor, or information provider, asks a fee, β, for its service. It observes each interaction with a probability q, for which it has to pay a cost C(q) ≥ 0, and updates the record of the player's reputation accordingly. We assume that C(q) is a monotonically increasing convex function such that the cost is zero with no observation and is infinite with complete observation. The cost function is proportional to a parameter γ ≥ 0 (see SI text, Sec. S1.5).
With probability 1 − q, the monitor records fake information randomly based on the average ratio of good and bad players in the population. For example, if 90% of the players have a good reputation, then a faking monitor assigns a good reputation to the recipient with a probability of 90%, irrespective of the recipient's actual behaviour. We assume that faking incurs no cost to the monitor.
C. Assessment rules: SCORING, MILD, and STERN
A monitor assesses the donor's behaviour according to an assessment rule, which determines whether the donor obtains a good or a bad reputation (G or B). We consider three assessment rules called SCORING, MILD, and STERN (see Tab. I). The SCORING rule simply considers that cooperation and defection are good and bad, respectively, irrespective of the recipient's reputation. MILD and STERN rules follow the same assessment when the recipient has a good reputation, whereas they consider that defection against bad players is justified, i.e., a good behaviour (see D → B column in Tab. I). The MILD and STERN rules differ when a donor helps a bad recipient. Such a behaviour is regarded as good by the MILD rule, whereas it is regarded as bad by the STERN rule (see C → B column in Tab. I) We introduce errors in the monitors' assessments. With a small probability µ, a monitor may assign a reputation opposite to that intended. Moreover, we assume that all players have a good reputation to begin with.
D. Social learning among players
We study the co-evolution of players and monitors by combining pairwise comparison and adaptive dynamics, both well established techniques in evolutionary game theory [29, 30] .
The players gradually change the relative frequencies of their strategies, denoted by (x C , x D , x R ), where the subscripts denote unconditional cooperators (C), unconditional defectors (D), and conditional cooperators (R, for 'reciprocators'). Their evolution is driven by an imitation process based on a pairwise payoff comparison with random exploration, given byẋ
for each strategy σ ∈ {C, D, R}, where π σ represents the payoffs of players obeying strategy σ (see SI text, Sec. S1.4 for its derivation). The first term of the right-hand side of Eq.
(1) represents random exploration; with a small probability , the players explore different strategies in a uniformly random manner. The second term of the right-hand side of Eq. (1) represents imitation based on a pairwise payoff comparison; with a probability 1 − , a randomly selected player compares her payoff and another randomly selected player's payoff, and imitate the latter player's strategy with a probability given by a sigmoid function, 1/ [1 + exp(−w∆)], where ∆ is the payoff difference [31] . Equation (1) is tuned by a parameter w > 0, which represents the speed with which players switch to a better strategy [31] .
E. Voting between monitors and their adaptive dynamics
The monitors' evolution is driven by voting by their clients (i.e., conditional cooperators).
We assume for simplicity that only two monitors, denoted by 1 and 2, are competing. Most of the time, the two monitors behave alike. Occasionally, one monitor (monitor 1) slightly changes the parameter values from (q, β) to (q , β ) at random. The clients of the monitors compare their payoffs, which are different between the two monitors, and 'vote with their hands' on which monitor is better. That is, the clients show the monitors how many of them will move to a better monitor, given by
for monitor i ∈ {1, 2}, if the monitors continue to use the slightly-changed parameter values (i.e., (q, β) and (q , β ). Here, x R i /x R is the frequency of clients that vote for monitor i (numerator) relative to the total frequency of clients (denominator) and π R i represents the payoff of clients that use monitor i. Moreover, the parameter α > 0 represents how strongly the clients vote for the monitor whose clients do better. This parameter corresponds to how nimbly the monitors evolve their parameters. On receiving the results of the voting, a less popular monitor, who will lose some clients in the future if it continues to use the present parameter values, will quickly follow suit and adopt the more popular monitor's parameter values. This process can be modelled by adaptive dynamics (see SI text, Sec. S1.5) [32] .
The voting is assumed to be much faster than the change in the player's behaviour from conditional to unconditional cooperation or defection.
III. RESULTS
A. The SCORING rule cannot stabilise cooperation
When both monitors adopt the SCORING rule, the system cannot reach stable cooperation, even if the initial population of players consists entirely of conditional cooperators. When the monitors adopt the MILD or STERN rule, they can secure stable cooperation supported by frequent monitoring, provided the initial fraction of conditional cooperators is sufficiently large (Fig. 2(b-e) ). Interestingly, this mutualism between conditional cooperators and monitors is achieved even if the initial frequency of monitoring is zero, i.e., q = 0. A bootstrapping process allows the monitoring frequency to quickly increase (see Fig. 2(c,e) ).
What controls this growth of monitoring is the intensity with which players select a better monitor in voting (i.e., α) relative to that with which they change their own strategy (i.e., w). We numerically find the minimum fraction of conditional cooperators (i.e., the minimum x R ) needed to establish a stable mutualism for various values of α and w (Fig. 3 ).
In the case of the SCORING rule, as expected, the monitors cannot sustain their monitoring frequency even if the population consists entirely of conditional cooperators ( Fig. 3(a,d) ).
For the MILD and the STERN rules, we find that stable mutualism can be reached if α is sufficiently large (Fig. 3 (b,c,e,f)); a strong competition between monitors is essential.
Moreover, the required initial fraction of conditional cooperators decreases as w becomes smaller, provided that the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation (i.e., b/c) is sufficiently large (Fig. 3(e,f) ). These two observations together imply that if the voters (i.e., conditional cooperators) select monitors faster than they switch strategies, then the monitors are forced to establish reliable monitoring, and thereby the users enjoy a cooperative society supported by the monitoring system. That is, with a STERN assessment, the system can more easily succeed in establishing the mutualism, even when the competition between the monitors is relatively weak.
D. STERN is dominant if STERN and MILD rules compete
So far, we have assumed that the two monitors adopt the same assessment rule. What if different assessment rules compete? Let us assume that, after a long time over which the two monitors use the same assessment rule, one of them adopts a different rule, but both monitors still use the same parameters q and β. We can easily see that the payoff to the STERN monitor is always higher than that to the MILD monitor (see SI text, Sec. S2). This is because conditional cooperators using the STERN monitor's information (STERN users) gain relatively higher payoffs than those using the MILD monitor (MILD users); when they interact, MILD users cooperate more with STERN users, whereas STERN users cooperate less with MILD users [33] . Thus, STERN is again more robust than MILD, in the sense of the competition between the two assessment rules [33, 34] .
E. The STERN rule achieves lower cooperation with severe surveillance, whereas the MILD rule achieves higher cooperation with loose monitoring
Given a population that has established a stable mutualism, it is interesting to see whether monitoring is severe or not and how cooperative the players are. To study this, we numerically observe the equilibrium states of populations varying in the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation in the donation game (i.e., b/c) and in the ratio between monitoring cost and cooperation cost (i.e., γ/c) under the two assessment rules MILD and STERN. The characteristics of equilibria under the three assessment rules differ qualitatively with respect to the frequency of monitoring (Fig. 4(a,b,c) ) and the cooperativeness of the players (Fig. 4 (d,e,f)).
In the case of the SCORING rule, again, the monitors cannot increase their monitoring frequency and the players fail to establish cooperative populations ( 1. In this situation, monitor 1 assigns a good reputation to player B, because the monitor thinks that the game is in the C → G scenario (see Tab. I). However, monitor 2 assigns a bad reputation to player B, because it thinks that the game is in the C → B scenario.
In this process, the existence of player A, who has conflicting reputations in the eyes of the two monitors, yields another player who also has conflicting reputations. Thus the number of players with conflicting reputation inexorably grows [35] . As a consequence, the degree of cooperation under the STERN rule becomes significantly smaller than that under the MILD rule ( Fig 
F. Robustness checks
For the results of comparisons between different initial states of players (i.e., (
and different shapes of the cost function for monitoring (i.e., C(q)), see the SI text, Secs. S3
and S4, respectively. Neither consideration changes our results qualitatively. In a few parameter sets unde the MILD rule, we observed stable periodic oscillations (see the SI text, Sec. S6 for detail).
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied a co-evolutionary model of indirect reciprocity in which players request information about reputations and monitors supply it. Thus players and monitors mutually benefit from using and providing information. We compared three different assessment rules MILD monitors, players achieve more cooperative states under less-frequent monitoring, whereas with STERN monitors, players achieve less cooperative states and are under severe surveillance, i.e., q ≈ 1 (Sec. III E). However, cooperative mutualism can be more easily obtained with STERN monitors than with MILD monitors in the sense that the cost-tobenefit ratio and the cost for monitoring can be larger.
In evolutionary studies of symbiosis, the so-called Red Queen's hypothesis is often invoked. It says that competing species are exposed to arms races and therefore those evolving faster are advantaged [36, 37] . However, recent theoretical studies have found that sometimes the species evolving slowly can win. This is called the Red King effect [38, 39] . In the Red King effect, immobility can be a form of commitment that obliges other species to give way. In the present study, a similar effect enables a stable mutualism between players and monitors; players are the hosts that evolve slowly and promote the monitors' costly monitoring.
Several works in economics have studied repeated games with costly monitoring of opponents' actions [21, [40] [41] [42] . These studies focused on the individual trade-off between the value of information and the cost of its acquisition and did not consider how to promote costly sharing of information among individuals. Gazzale presented a model of seller-buyer transaction in which buyers can report information about sellers to a rating system and their reporting is visible by sellers, and Gazzale and Khopkar experimentally studied how this mechanism promotes costly sharing of information [15, 16] . In their model, a buyer's costly reporting of information about a seller builds the buyer's reputation as an information spreader. This increases the effort level of the buyer's future partners afraid of receiving a bad reputation, and thus buyers have an incentive to report information even if it is costly to do so. In our model, instead, monitors make an effort because by doing so their information users reward them.
The above-mentioned studies did not assume that the reported information may be fake and that deceivers who shirk costly monitoring gain more than serious information providers.
This problem of spreading false information about reputations was, as far as we know, first studied in biology by Nakamaru and Kawata [14] . In their study, a 'conditional advisor' was capable of detecting and suppressing free-riding liars. This is a strategy by which a player (player A) spreads reputation information about others, which is received from another player (player B) only when B had previously cooperated with A. The conditional advisor strategy, therefore, needs a large amount of information acquisition for the verification of reputation information. In contrast, our model does not require individuals to verify their information; they only need to select a more beneficial monitor. This implies that information users can trust information providers more easily when the providers are exposed to competition with each other.
Rockenbach and Sadrieh conducted a behavioural experiment on the subject of costly information spreading [18] . They demonstrated that people tend to share helpful information with others even if reporting it provides no individual benefit. Such an instinct for the acquisition and sharing of information could evolve if it is usually rewarded [19] . In our model, we assumed that all individuals including players and monitors are only motivated by self-interest. We demonstrated theoretically that the reward for reporting helpful information can overcome the problem of costly information acquisition, even if individuals have no social preferences other than pure self-interest.
The present study is restricted to a simple model, and the following extensions would provide further insights. First, we studied competition between two monitors only, rather than between many. In real life, situations with more than two competitors are common, and 'hub' individuals with huge numbers of connections on social networks are observed [43] .
Whether a hub information provider emerges from competition among many monitors or not is an interesting question. Second, we assumed that when monitors fail to engage in costly observation, they deceive client players by faking random information. In real life, such falsification might be strategic; for example, monitors might be corrupted by players offering them money for reporting a good reputation [17] . Third, we showed that the competition between monitors driven by their clients' voting 'by hands' rather than 'by feet' enables cooperation; clients only show their preference over monitors under voting by hands, whereas they actually move to a better monitor under voting by feet. This is in contrast to most studies of evolutionary dynamics, which typically assume voting by feet.
If monitors compete under voting by feet, it seems likely that one monitor could take the entire of the clients, even if they used the same parameters. Therefore, it is important to study whether cooperation emerges if clients vote with their feet as well as the difference between the two types of voting. Fourth, our model assumed that social learning among players occurs in a well-mixed manner, i.e., that the population does not have structure.
However, it could be the case that a population has a structure; people may learn from their neighbours [44] . In that case, cooperation might be established even if the initial fraction of conditional cooperators is smaller than that in the present result (see Fig. 3 ).
This is because a structure increases clustering of players having the same strategy and helps cooperation [45] . Fifth, in our model, we only introduced errors in the monitors' assessments, which yielded conflicting opinions about a player's reputation and thus players under the STERN rule were less cooperative than those under the MILD rule. To introduce other types of errors, e.g., errors in each player's perception about reputation-related information, increases such conflicting opinions and therefore it could reduce cooperation more.
An important characteristic of human behaviour is the ability to establish large-scale cooperation [46] . Such large-scale cooperation partially depends upon the development of large-scale information sharing, which suffers from a tragedy of the commons. As we have discussed, one possibility for overcoming this dilemma is to introduce competition between information sharing systems. We hope that this study helps to build understanding of sustainable mechanisms for information provision under indirect reciprocity.
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